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This article addresses the question whether companies from emerging economies create 
shareholder value through foreign acquisitions.  The popular business press usually views 
these foreign acquisitions very positively.  The stock markets have often reacted 
negatively to the acquisitions.  The management always claims that the acquisition is in 
the long term strategic interests of the firm.  This article attempts to shed light on these 
conflicting positions: short term versus long term, and financial versus strategic logic. 
Using a mix of stock market reaction for a small sample and three in-depth case studies, I 
conclude that large foreign acquisitions from India have not created shareholder value.  
The causes of this under-performance are: too little integration, agency problems, and 
easy capital.  Finally, I use a case study to illustrate a successful approach to foreign 
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Companies originating from emerging economies have been increasingly pursuing 
international acquisitions.  This is to be expected and has been predicted for a long time.  
Companies need certain ownership-specific advantages to compete successfully outside 
their home markets.  Such advantages are likely to increase as emerging economies reach 
higher levels of development.  This internationalization trend by emerging economy 
firms has been driven by various factors such as, the liberalization of their domestic 
economies, globalization of their industries, intensity of competition, managerial 
capabilities, and access to capital markets. The share of emerging economies in global 
cross-border acquisitions rose from 4% in 1987 to 13% in 2005 to 20% in 2008.1  
Furthermore, in the last decade, the scale of these foreign acquisitions has increased 
significantly.  Tata Steel from India acquired Corus Steel for $13 billion; Hindalco 
Industries purchased Novelis for $5.7 billion.  Chinese oil company CNPC acquired 
PetroKazakhastan for $4.2 billion; Lenovo Group bought IBM's personal computer 
business for $1.8 billion.  Mexican building materials company CEMEX acquired the 
British RMC Group for $5.8 billion, and the Australian Rinker Group for $14.2 billion.  
The Brazilin mining company Vale acquired Inco for $18.9 billion.   
 
These mega-deals involving acquisitions by emerging economy firms have attracted 
much attention from the business press.  In the developed countries, some welcome this 
as a positive trend: a new source of capital and knowledge; this is globalization at its best 
and benefits everybody.  Others regard these acquisitions as a threatening trend; the 
world becoming 'flat' is leading to new competition from unexpected places.  Some have 
even called for protectionist intervention.  Not surprisingly, in the emerging economies, 
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the business press has been unequivocally positive, even euphoric about these foreign 
acquisitions.  There is much talk about emerging giants and new powerhouses.  Some see 
this as the revenge of the former colonies against the imperialist powers.  The Indian 
newspaper The Economic Times exclaimed "Corus, the erstwhile British Steel and one of 
the icons of Her Majesty's Empire will now fly the [Indian] Tricolour."   But, what often 
is under-emphasized or assumed away in this discussion by the popular press is to what 
extent the acquiring firms create value for their shareholders.  This issue might be less 
critical if the acquisition is carried out by a state owned enterprise or a sovereign wealth 
fund pursuing national interest.  But many of the acquiring firms are private, publicly 
listed firms that have a fiduciary responsibility to their shareholders.  This paper 
addresses the question whether such publicly listed companies from emerging economies 
create shareholder value through foreign acquisitions, and in particular, through large 
acquisitions. 
 
The popular business press usually views foreign acquisitions by emerging economy 
firms very positively.  The stock markets have often reacted negatively to the 
acquisitions.  The management always claims that the acquisition is in the long term 
strategic interests of the firm.  This article attempts to shed light on these conflicting 
positions: short term versus long term, and financial versus strategic logic.  I describe 
below a common story to illustrate the tensions. 
 
On 31 January 2007, Tata Steel increased its offer price to acquire Corus Steel to 608p a 
share, topping the 603p offer from rival bidder, the Brazilian company CSN, thus 
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clinching the deal.  The Managing Director of Tata Steel, B. Muthuraman, cast his firm's 
victory in broad light as a milestone for Indian business and the country's economy.  This 
upbeat mood was echoed by India's finance minister, Palaniappan Chidambaram, who 
said the successful bid reflected the new-found confidence of Indian industry.2  The 
shareholders of Tata Steel were not nearly so enthused, and penalized the stock by 11% 
the next day. Ratan Tata, the chairman of the Tata group, responded "Quite frankly I do 
feel [the stock market] is taking a short-term and harsh view.  In the future somebody will 
look back and say we did the right thing." Analysts argued that Tata was overpaying for 
the acquisition, citing, for example, that the price was 9 times Corus's (EBITDA) 
earnings that dwarfed the 6 times that Mittal Steel recently paid to acquire Arcelor.  Mr. 
Muthuraman accepted that the deal "may look expensive" but was in fact in the strategic 
interests of both companies allowing Tata Steel access to Corus's markets and Corus the 
access to cheap raw materials and low costs of steel making. 
 
I first briefly review the previous research on acquisitions.  My research sample consists 
of all large foreign acquisitions by Indian companies during the years 2000-09.  I 
consider the stock market performance of these 17 acquisitions during a one-year time 
window.  I supplement this small sample study by examining in-depth the three largest 
acquisitions using a case study approach, and conclude that the foreign acquisitions from 
India have not created shareholder value.  The causes of this under-performance are: too 
little integration, agency problems, and easy capital.  Finally, I use a case study to 
illustrate a successful approach to foreign acquisitions: significant synergies, reasonable 




There has been a tremendous amount of research on acquisitions, especially in the fields 
of finance, strategy and international business.  I review very briefly the previous 
research at three levels: acquisitions in general, cross-border acquisitions, and cross-
border acquisitions from emerging economies. 
 
Acquisitions create value due to synergy between the acquiring and target firms.   
Synergy is derived from operational gains, market power, or some form of financial gain.  
Assuming efficient capital markets and limited potential for increasing market power, the 
emphasis has been on operational gains due to economies of scale or scope as the source 
of synergy.  In the resource based view of the firm, company growth is a quest for 
productive opportunities to profitably use firm-specific assets, such as technological, 
marketing and distribution capabilities.  Growth is the best way to use these specialized 
resources because market frictions prevent the firm from trading its stock of valuable 
resources.3  This synergy gain is then divided between the acquiring and target firms.  
The more efficient is the market for corporate control, the larger is the share of gains 
captured by the target firm.  Much empirical research confirms that acquisitions do create 
value.4  However, acquiring firms on the average do not gain value; somewhere between 
half to three-fourths of acquiring firms actually lose shareholder value.5   Given this well 
accepted result, other explanations are needed for why so many acquisitions take place.  
There might be an agency problem: managers do acquisitions to maximize their own 
utility at the expense of the shareholders.  Another possibility is that hubristic managers 
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overestimate their competence with respect to identifying and exploiting synergies.6  This 
would explain why so many acquiring firms do not create shareholder value. 
 
There is also much literature that examines cross-border acquisitions.   The argument for 
synergies is stronger than in the case of domestic acquisitions because of greater market 
frictions.  Firms extract above-normal profits from foreign direct investment by 
internalizing host-country market imperfections when their firm-specific resources cannot 
be easily traded across country boundaries.  This view is embedded in the exploitation 
perspective, whereby firms make use of their specialized resources by expanding into 
foreign markets.  But there are also increased challenges with post-acquisition integration 
due to cultural and institutional barriers.  The empirical evidence is inconclusive about 
acquiring firms creating shareholder value through foreign acquisitions.7  A survey-based 
study conducted by the consulting firm KPMG concluded that 83% of 700 cross-border 
deals in the period 1996-1998 had not delivered shareholder value.  But, interestingly, in 
the same survey, 82% of the respondents believed that the deal they had been involved in 
had been a success.8 
 
In contrast to the exploitation perspective described above, international acquisitions by 
emerging economy firms might be motivated by the potential to acquire specialized 
strategic resources.  There are inherent problems in transacting intangible resources and 
capabilities through market mechanisms.  Foreign acquisitions might be the best way for 
emerging economy firms to gain these strategic capabilities quickly.  This 'reverse' flow 
of specialized resources and capabilities from the target to the emerging economy 
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acquirer is often mentioned in both the academic literature and the popular press as the 
major benefit of such acquisitions.  The driving logic for these acquisitions is to exploit 
and/or acquire specialized firm-specific resources that result in competitive advantage 
and above normal profitability. 
 
There is much less empirical research on international acquisitions by emerging economy 
firms.  Once again, the empirical evidence is inconclusive.  Aybar and Ficci analyze 433 
foreign acquisitions made by firms from various emerging economies (mostly from Latin 
America and Asia) during the period 1991-2004.  Using event study methodology, they 
find that on average the cross-border acquiring firms do not create value; more than half 
the firms destroyed shareholder value.9  Gubbi et al analyze 425 cross-border acquisitions 
by Indian firms during 2000-2007.  Again using the standard event study methodology, 
they find that these acquiring firms do create shareholder value; the ratio of value 
creating to value destroying acquisitions is 60:40.10  In spite of the inconclusive evidence 
in the academic literature, the popular business press is very positive on foreign 
acquisitions by emerging economy firms.  A good example of this genre is the recent 
book India's Global Powerhouses: How They Are Taking On The World, which 
concludes that Indian companies "have become self-assured and savvy investors, 
financing large deals and paying global prices."11  The empirical evidence presented in 




Event study methodology focuses on the stock market reaction to a particular event in a 
short time window, from a few (typically 1 to 10) days before the announcement of the 
event to a few days after the announcement.  The firm's stock market change is adjusted 
for changes in the overall stock market and the firm's systematic risk using a common 
linear market model. This methodology has become the standard way to measure value 
creation in the acquisition studies, at least partly because it has desirable statistical 
properties.  This methodology assumes that the stock market response to the acquisition 
announcement is instantaneous, complete and unbiased, based on the semi-strong form of 
the efficient market hypothesis.  There are several problems with this methodology in the 
context of large foreign acquisitions by emerging economy firms.  First, it is debatable 
how efficient the stock markets are in emerging economies.  Second, and more 
importantly, the focal events -- cross-border acquisitions by emerging economy firms -- 
are complex, infrequent, and novel strategic initiatives.   It is likely that the stock market 
collectively does not fully understand these events and is prone to heuristic biases.  Third, 
the stock market reacts immediately to an acquisition announcement based on its past 
experience with similar deals and its incomplete understanding of the current deal; the 
event study methodology measures only this immediate reaction.  Over time more 
information about the prospective deal, and eventually information about post-acquisition 
performance is revealed.  The stock market then reaches a new equilibrium that reflects 
the value created (or destroyed) by the acquisition.  This period of resolution of 
uncertainty, from the announcement to the new equilibrium, can range from a few 
 10
months to a few years.12  It is thus useful to supplement event study methodology with 
other research using long-term performance measures. 
 
The problem with long-term performance measures is that other confounding events 
occur and it is difficult to isolate the impact of the focal acquisition.  I will resolve this 
dilemma by measuring stock market performance from the day before the announcement 
to one year after the announcement.  Since I study large foreign acquisitions, it is unlikely 
that the acquiring firm has faced another similarly dramatic event in one year.  For all 
firms in my sample the acquisition is completed within this one-year time window, and 
the stock market has seen some indications of post-acquisition performance.  
 
The performance measure I will use is simply the 'relative stock market returns' defined 
as the shareholder returns of the acquiring firm minus the returns to a broad index of the 
stock market, during the time window one day before the announcement of the 
acquisition to one year after the announcement.  For stocks with firm systematic risk 
(measured by 'beta') close to one, this is an acceptable way to measure performance.  This 
simple measure has the advantage of minimal manipulation of the data, and requires no 
assumptions about stock market behavior, and is probably close to how many investors 
assess the firm's performance.  As a check, I also calculate 'buy and hold abnormal 
returns' for the same time window using the capital asset pricing model and find no 
difference in results. 
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My sample consists of all acquisitions above $500 million completed by Indian firms 
during the years 2000 to 2009.  After discarding firms for which stock market data were 
not available, I end up with 21 acquisitions, 17 foreign and 4 domestic, listed in Table 1.  
It is interesting to note that all acquisitions, except one, were initiated during the years 
2006-2008, the boom years preceding the recent financial crisis. 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
A disadvantage of my approach to measuring performance is that it is not well suited for 
statistical tests.  However this is not a major issue for my research since I have 21 
observations and will report only descriptive tabulations.  In any case, my 'sample' is the 
entire population of large acquisitions by Indian companies.  All the previous academic 
research uses large samples and statistical tests.  While this has obvious advantages, it 
does not provide an in-depth analysis at the firm level.  I will supplement my small 
sample study with clinical case study analysis of the three largest acquisitions and 
attempt to explain what factors led to value creation or destruction in these three cases.  
For these three case studies, I can also examine other significant events faced by the firms 
that might have a confounding effect on shareholder returns. 
 
Empirical Results 
Table 2 reports the stock market reaction to the 21 acquisitions in my sample using the 
two measures: the simple relative returns and the academically more rigorous buy and 
hold abnormal returns. I used the Sensex, the benchmark index of the Bombay Stock 
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Exchange, to calculate these measures.  It is clear that the two measures are very highly 
correlated; the correlation coefficient is 0.99.  This provides empirical support for using 
the simpler measure of relative returns. 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
I categorized the stock market performance of the acquiring firms as follows: strongly 
positive if the returns exceed 10% using both measures, and slightly positive if the 
returns lie between zero and 10% on both measures, and similarly for negative returns.  I 
classify two acquisitions as 'neutral' for which the returns were between -10% and +10%, 
and the signs were different for the two measures.  The 10% cutoff is reasonable, even if 
somewhat arbitrary, because the Indian stock market was very volatile in this time frame; 
the one year Sensex returns range from -49.1% to +65.7% in my sample.  The stock 
market performance for the 21 acquisitions in the sample is summarized in Table 3.  The 
number of foreign acquisitions exhibiting positive and negative performance is about 
equal.  These results are inconclusive, and consistent with previous academic research.  
There is no evidence to support the view that large foreign acquisitions by Indian firms 
have created shareholder value.  
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
While I focus on the one-year time window, Table 4 provides the comparison of the 
short-term (day before the announcement to 5 days after the announcement) stock market 
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reaction and the long-term reaction to the acquisitions, using the relative returns measure.  
It is interesting to note that the correlation coefficient between the returns for the two 
windows is only 0.21.  This provides support for supplementing previous research using 
the event study methodology with other research (such as this article) using long-term 
performance measures. 
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
Financing acquisitions 
"Unlike most international M&A transactions that typically feature stock swaps in the 
financing arithmetic, Indian acquirers have for the most part paid cash for their targets, 
helped by a combination of internal resources and borrowings."13   This is even truer for 
the large foreign acquisitions in my sample.  All the 17 foreign acquisitions in the sample 
were paid for with cash; of the 4 domestic acquisitions, only two were paid with cash.  
The cash acquisitions involved an increase in debt leverage, and thus increased the risk 
involved in the acquisitions.  Easy access to inexpensive debt capital during the boom 
years 2006-2008 might also have contributed to preference for cash acquisitions.  Even 
though this could not have been anticipated at the time of the acquisitions, the increased 
leverage often turned out to be a problem during the recent financial crisis and credit 
squeeze.  For example, Tata Motors had problems in 2009 to refinance the bridge loans it 
had incurred to acquire Jaguar Land Rover. 
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As a general proposition, target firms prefer stock swaps and receive equity when they 
are confident that the assets that will be acquired will create value for the buying firm.   It 
is not a positive signal that all the Indian foreign acquisitions were done for cash.  One 
reason for the cash transactions could be that many Indian firms are owned or controlled 
by promoter shareholders, who also comprise the management.  Foreign sellers are often 
hesitant to invest through stock swaps in firms they perceive may not always be run 
'professionally,' according to some private fund insiders.14 
 
Another explanation for the cash transactions could be that the Indian promoters are wary 
of stock swaps because they might not wish to dilute their equity share in the company.   
In general acquiring firms prefer cash transactions if they believe their stocks are 
undervalued.  With the benefit of hindsight, it is difficult to argue that the stocks of the 
Indian acquiring firms were systematically undervalued during the two and half years 
leading up to the financial crisis.  It is, however, true that the Indian stock market has 
recovered dramatically since March 2009. 
 
It is also notable that all the acquisitions in my sample were friendly deals.  This by itself 
does not imply that the Indian acquirers overpaid for the acquisitions.  It is, however, true 
that a generous price will tend to make the deal friendlier.  Another reason for friendly 
deals is that the Indian acquirers have a strong preference to retain the current 




I next examine the three largest foreign acquisitions in greater depth to understand what 
factors led to value creation or destruction, and try to isolate the influence of confounding 
factors on stock market performance.  I exclude the ONGC-Imperial Energy acquisition 
because ONGC is a government-controlled company, and its emphasis is on control of 
natural resources rather than on specialized firm-specific resources.  Whereas the primary 
focus of most acquisitions and of this article is on the specialized capabilities.  The three 
acquisitions I study in depth are: Tata Steel-Corus, Hindalco-Novelis, and Tata Motors-
Jaguar and Land Rover.  These three acquisitions have garnered much public attention; it 
is not coincidental that Kumar et al mention these three acquisitions in the introductory 
chapter of their book on India’s emerging powerhouses.16 
 
Tata Steel and Corus 
Tata Steel belongs to the Tata group, which is the largest business group in India with 
presence in a wide variety of industries ranging from information technology to 
chemicals to hotels.  After the initial announcement in October 2006, Tata Steel and the 
Brazilian firm CSN engaged in a bidding war to acquire Corus Steel, an Anglo-Dutch 
company previously knows as British Steel.  The stock market did not move much in 
reaction to the initial announcement.  On 31 January 2007 Tata Steel increased the offer 
price and clinched the acquisition.  The stock price of Tata Steel immediately plunged by 
11%.  The top management of Tata Steel responded by saying that the stock market 
reaction was short sighted, and that the acquisition would create shareholder value in the 
long term.  The stock price, which was at Rs. 459 the day before the increased offer, 
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quickly recovered to Rs. 471 on 16 April 2007.   In apparent vindication of top 
management’s position, the stock price zoomed up to Rs. 935 on 2 January 2008, far 
exceeding the gains in the Sensex index.   
 
Managing Director Muthuraman said that Corus brought to Tata Steel capacity of 19 
million tons per year at a cost of about $710 per ton, which is little more than half the 
cost of greenfield capacity of $1200 to $1300 per ton.  It gave Tata Steel access to the 
developed and mature markets in Europe where product quality and service is important.  
Corus also brought high R&D capability. He also forecast up to $350 million in savings 
after about three years from synergies in procuring materials, in marketing and in shared 
services. Steel prices would rise driven by demand from explosive growth in the biggest 
markets in the developing world: India and China.  Finally, he also believed there was a 
tremendous amount of cultural fit between Tata Steel and Corus.  For the deal to work, 
Tata had to improve the efficiency of Corus, whose profit margins at 7% were a quarter 
of those of Tata Steel.  Ratan Tata stated “I think our plan would be to try to make the 
UK operations more profitable.”17  Maybe the strategic logic of the acquisition was right 
after all, and it had taken the stock market about 15 months to fully appreciate the 
complexities and subtleties involved in the acquisition.  Or, more likely the strategic logic 
of the acquisition was flawed, and some other confounding event explains the rise in the 
stock price. 
 
Tata Steel's cost of production at around $450/ton is among the lowest in the world.  
Even in 2009 when the global average cost had reached about $700-750/ton, Tata Steel 
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managed to control its costs to about $500/ton.  But this advantage is not transferable to 
Corus.  Captive raw materials is the primary source of Tata Steel’s competitive 
advantage.  Tata Steel meets 100% of its iron ore requirements and 50% of its coking 
coal requirement through backward integration.  Whereas Corus is completely exposed to 
raw material price volatility due to lack of any significant backward integration.  One 
important synergy stated at the time of the acquisition was the leveraging of low cost 
slabs from India that could be used by Corus to produce various finished products.  But in 
2006 Tata Steel did not have spare slab capacity.  Tata Steel also benefits from low labor 
cost and tight capacity in its primary market of India.  Corus, on the other hand, has high 
labor costs, strong unions and excess capacity. 
 
Tata Steel paid about $710 per ton of capacity, which is low compared to greenfield cost 
of $1200-1300 per ton.  This is a false comparison since Corus was one of the highest 
cost producers in Europe and there is excess steel capacity in the European markets.  
When Tata Steel acquired two smaller Asian steel companies, NatSteel and Millennium 
Steel in 204 and 2005, it paid a price of $374 and $333 per ton, respectively.  In 2010, 
Anand Rathi Financial Services values Corus capacity at around US$360-400/ton, which 
implies that Corus is worth little more than half what Tata Steel paid for it three years 
ago.18   Anand Rathi projects that in 2011, Corus would comprise 65% of Tata Steel's 
consolidated revenues but only about 23% of EBITDA earnings.  Even based on 
expectations for 2012, Anand Rathi does not expect Corus’ return on capital employed to 
exceed 3%, which is clearly low even compared to global peers.  
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Tata Steel paid 9 times EBITDA to acquire Corus.  In comparison, Mittal Steel acquired 
Arcelor in 2006 for an EBITDA multiple of 6. This was in spite of the fact that Corus 
was less profitable and less efficient compared to Arcelor.  Also, the entire amount was 
paid in cash by Tata Steel as opposed to a combination of cash and share swap in case of 
the Arcelor deal.  Tata Steel probably overpaid for Corus. 
 
In 2009 Corus began decommissioning its Teesside Cast Products plant in UK, thus 
confirming that the Corus capacity was not that valuable.  Angry unions threatened strike 
action against Tata Steel-Corus because this capacity reduction would lead to laying off 
1,600 workers, with a possible 8,000 more job losses in the local supply chain. A 
company statement said the Teesside plant was a major drag on profitability, denting it 
with $177 million losses during the September 2009 quarter, due to restructuring costs. 
 
It can be argued that the acquisition involved minimal synergies and that Tata Steel 
overpaid for Corus.  The rise in the stock price of Tata Steel is driven more by the steel 
cycle rather than by the acquisition.  Steel prices (represented by FOB price of hot rolled 
steel) in the international market increased from an average of $564/ton in 2007 to 
$714/ton in 2008. However, as global steel demand cracked in the second half of 2008, 
steel prices in the international market started declining significantly. Prices declined 
from the highs in 2008 to $380 in June 2009. Steel prices have recovered and in 2010 are 
hovering at $575/ton.19  In parallel to the steel cycle, the stock price of Tata Steel moved 
from Rs. 410 on 31 January 2007 (the day the acquisition was clinched), to a peak of Rs. 
922 on 21 May 2008, to a trough of Rs. 151 on 28 November 2008, to its recent price of 
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Rs. 629 on 22 March 2010.  The stock price of Tata Steel has been extremely volatile 
driven by the steel cycle and the economic cycle.  The Corus acquisition is equivalent to 
the shareholders of Tata Steel placing a highly leveraged (of the $13 billon acquisition 
price, $9 billion came from increased debt) bet on steel prices.  If that is what the 
shareholders wanted, they could easily have done it on their own in the stock and futures 
markets, without an expensive acquisition. 
 
Hindalco and Novelis 
Hindalco is the flagship company belonging to the Birla group, one of the largest and 
most diversified family business houses in India.  Hindalco, an industry leader in 
aluminum and copper, is one of the biggest producers of primary aluminum in Asia.  In 
2007 Hindalco acquired Novelis, a world leader in aluminum rolling and can recycling.  
After the acquisition, Hindalco as an integrated producer ranks among the global top five 
aluminum companies.  Hindalco paid a price of $44.93 per share for acquiring Novelis, 
which represented a premium of 16.6% over the price before the announcement date of 
11 February 2007.  However, this was a premium of 49.1% to the closing price on 25 
January, the day before speculation of possible Hindalco bid surfaced.20  On the day of 
the announcement, Hindalco shares fell 13.7%; by the end of the next day, the Hindalco 
shared had underperformed the Sensex by nearly 15% in two days.  Kumar Mangalam 
Birla, Hindalco's Chairman, asked his shareholders to remain "patient" and wrote in the 
annual report "However, if you look at the bigger picture, this is one of the most striking 
acquisitions and over the long-term will undeniably create enormous shareholder value."  
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One year after the announcement, the stock of Hindalco had underperformed the Sensex 
by 26%. 
 
Hindalco forward integrated from smelting into rolling products by acquiring Novelis.  
Debu Bhattacharya, Hindalco's managing director, explained the strategy as follows: 
profitability in the upstream business is higher but more volatile because prices are set on 
the London Metals Exchange (LME); the profitability of the downstream business is 
lower but also less volatile.  Hindalco acquired Novelis to "optimally balance" between 
upstream and downstream operations as a natural hedge against volatility in the 
commodity prices of aluminum on the LME.  This is weak strategic logic, and the 
aluminum industry structure is changing in exactly the opposite direction towards de-
integration. 
 
The aluminum industry can be divided into two value chain stages.  The upstream 
segment includes bauxite mining, alumina refining, and primary aluminum production.  
The downstream segment produces finished aluminum products and includes rolling 
mills, extrusion and casting.  This is a natural 'breaking point' in the industry since 
aluminum ingot is a commodity and transactions between the upstream and downstream 
segments can easily be done through markets.  There is thus little reason to vertically 
integrate across these two stages in the aluminum industry.21  The fully integrated 
aluminum company has become increasingly less common.22 
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According to Richard Evans, executive vice-president of Alcan, the aluminum industry 
has correctly been de-integrating between the upstream producers of primary aluminum 
and downstream producers of finished products, "each with its own business imperatives 
and needs... One of the best recent examples of this is of course Alcan's own spinoff of 
the new rolled product company Novelis."23  This trend has been driven by two changes 
in the industry: 1) in late 1970s LME began trading contracts for aluminum that rendered 
transparent the underlying price, and 2) in mid 1990s downstream producers started 
charging their customers for conversion only and passing through the price of aluminum.  
Because of these change the integrated business model was "no longer the highest value 
alternative," according to Alcan top management.24 Brian Sturgell, the first CEO of 
Novelis after the spin-off from Alcan, said that "from that point on, it was a question of 
when and how Alcan would optimize these upstream and downstream models."25  In May 
2004 Alcan decided to spin off its rolled products business as Novelis, so that the 
upstream and downstream businesses would be free to concentrate on their core 
competencies.  Rio Tinto, a diversified mining company, forward integrated by acquiring 
Alcan in November 2007, and has been increasingly divesting the downstream businesses 
such as packaging products. 
 
Even though most downstream producers passed on the aluminum price volatility to their 
customers by charging separately for conversion, Novelis signed fixed price contracts 
with four major customers in the hope of increasing its profit margins.  Unfortunately for 
Novelis, aluminum prices shot up a few months after the contracts.  In the first nine 
months of 2006, Novelis reported a loss of $170 million largely because of these fixed-
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price contracts that run up to 2011.  Hindalco had to carry these contracts after the 
Novelis acquisition.  In the third quarter of FY2008-09 Novelis reported $472 million in 
unrealized losses on derivatives to hedge exposure to commodities and foreign 
currencies.  These derivatives are used to hedge exposure to aluminum, primarily related 
to fixed-price contracts. 
 
Hindalco financed the Novelis acquisition with debt, which caused its debt service 
coverage ratio to drop from 15 times in 2006-07 to only 3 times in 2007-08, thus 
significantly increasing its risk profile.  The Novelis profitability has not lived up to the 
expectations of Hindalco management.  Novelis reported a net loss of $1.8 billion in the 
third quarter of FY2008-09, including charges of $1.5 billion for asset impairment.  
Hindalco had the dubious distinction of being the first Indian company to take a charge 
for goodwill impairment.  More recently, Novelis may have turned the corner towards 
profitability; it reported a net income of $68 million for the third quarter of FY2009-10 
 
Tata Motors and Jaguar/Land Rover 
Tata Motors is the largest manufacturer of commercial and passenger vehicles in India.  
In 2008 Tata Motors acquired from Ford Motor Company the two luxury car brands 
Jaguar and Land Rover (JLR).  The stock market's immediate reaction to the JLR 
acquisition was negative.  In the few days following the announcement of the JLR 
acquisition, the stock price of Tata Motors underperformed the Sensex index by about 
5%.   Balaji Jayaraman of Morgan Stanley said, buying Jaguar and Land Rover was 
“value-destructive given the lack of synergies and the high-cost operations involved”.  
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However, Tata Motors' officials expressed confidence in the deal's long-term potential.  
Managing Director Ravi Kant said the company was "pretty confident that Jaguar and 
Land Rover will add positively to our consolidated balance sheet."  "People are free to 
make their own opinions, but I think time will prove who is right," Kant said.26   Instead, 
the stock performance of Tata Motors worsened over the next year, and its shares 
underperformed the Sensex index by 36%.  It is, of course, true that this period coincided 
with the recent economic turbulence in the world, and a significant downturn in the 
global automotive market. 
 
Ford purchased Jaguar and Land Rover for $5 billon and sold them to Tata Motors for 
about half that price after several years of operating losses.  It is difficult to see how Tata 
Motors would have greater synergies than Ford with JLR.  There are no significant 
synergies between Tata Motors and JLR.  The two companies operate in different 
geographic markets, selling cars with different technology to very disparate customer 
segments.  Around the same time, Tata Motors was launching its much-publicized car the 
Tata Nano, the world's cheapest car.  Kant issued a clear directive: keep these vehicle 
lines separate and distinct.  "Each is going to chart its own future and own course,” he 
says.  "The conflict would come if we were to try to put them together."27  Tata has 
experience taking over global brands, and its strategy has been to let each business run its 
own entity, with modest input from the home office.  This is consistent with the view that 
there are minimal synergies between the two companies.   
 
 24
Tata Motors financed the acquisition with debt significantly increasing its risk profile.  
The company's ratio of EBITDA earnings to interest paid, an inverse measure of the 
firm's debt risk, used to be in the range 9 to 11 during the years 2005-2007; after the 
acquisition, the coverage ratio dropped to 5.9 in 2008.  By comparison, the coverage ratio 
for some successful auto companies in 2008 was: 86 for Toyota, 45 for Nissan, and 31 for 
Audi.  As mentioned earlier, Tata Motors had problems in refinancing he bridge loan in 
2009. 
 
While discussing the disappointing performance of Corus and JLR, Ratan Tata conceded 
in an interview with The Sunday Times in 2009 that, with hindsight, he might have gone 
too far too fast, but that nobody saw the crash coming. “If one had known there was 
going to be a meltdown then yes [Tata went too far] but nobody knew. Both the 
acquisitions were made, I would say, at an inopportune time in the sense that they were 
near the top of the market in terms of price.”28  Even if we accept the view that the timing 
of the JLR acquisition was unfortunate, there is still no positive rationale for the 
acquisition.  Lacking synergies, Tata Motors was behaving as a conglomerate in 
acquiring JLR.   There is much evidence that such conglomerate diversification does not 
create shareholder value; in fact, conglomerates on the average trade at a discount to their 
break-up value.  This situation is made worse if Tata Motors overpaid for the JLR 
acquisition, even if inadvertently.  ICICI Securities values JLR at only about $850 




Based on the empirical evidence presented above, both stock market performance and the 
case studies, I come to the conclusion that large foreign acquisitions by Indian firms have 
not created shareholder value for the acquiring firms, and have probably destroyed 
shareholder value.  The Economist comes to a similar conclusion that "several of 
corporate India's acquisitions now seem ill-advised."30  The causes of this negative 
outcome are too little integration to achieve synergies, agency problems, and inadequate 
discipline due to easy capital. 
  
Integration Light 
A strong economic or strategic rationale for synergies is the starting point for any 
successful acquisition.  Virtually no acquiring company would dispute this statement.  
But, many of the unsuccessful acquisitions involve weak logic dressed up with vacuous 
statements, such as 'global footprint,' 'scale,' and 'optimal balance.'   The Tata Motors-JLR 
acquisition does not even try to make a strong case based on synergies.  Hindalco 
attempts to justify the Novelis acquisition to achieve some vague balance to reduce risk.  
But, there is no need for an acquisition to achieve an objective that the shareholders can 
easily achieve on their own, such as diversify to reduce non-systematic risk.  A succinct 
but powerful way to state the logic of synergy is that an acquisition can create value when 
the company can exploit a (usually intangible) firm-specific resource that cannot be 
easily traded in a marketplace. 
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The Indian companies studied here approach integrating the acquisitions with a very light 
touch; Kaushik Chatterjee, the CFO of Tata Steel, calls this the Oriental approach as 
opposed to the Western approach.  He described the current Tata Steel-Corus 
conglomerate as two separate entities bridged together by the support functions like 
finance and HR.31  Citing examples from the Tata group, Kale et al urge companies 
"don't integrate your acquisitions, partner with them."32  Using the example of Hindalco-
Novelis, Kumar argues similarly that Indian acquirers do not try to consolidate 
acquisitions.33  I think that such a 'light' approach to integration does not, and will not 
lead to value creation.   
 
Foreign acquisitions by emerging economy firms often seek firm-specific intangible 
capabilities in areas such as technology, innovation, marketing and distribution.  These 
capabilities cannot just be bolted on to an existing organization.  Exploiting a firm-
specific resource through an acquisition involves applying or transferring or replicating 
the resource from one firm to another.  This must involve integrating the new resources 
into the existing organization, which in turn must involve significant organizational 
integration. Specialized capabilities are woven into the fabric of the organization -- that is 
what makes them 'firm-specific'.  If that were not the case, then there would be a 
reasonably efficient market for that resource, and no need for the acquisition in the first 
place.   
 
But that does not imply going to the other extreme.  Chatterjee equates the Western 
approach to "conquering" the acquisition; such a heavy-handed approach is likely to fail, 
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of course.  But this is a false 'straw man' argument.  Kumar too falls into the same trap 
when he states that in the "traditional approach" to acquisitions "the buyer has clear short-
term aims, but may not have thought through long-term goals."  The challenge is to find 
the appropriate degree of assimilation that preserves the strengths of the two companies 
but still achieves the synergies available trough the acquisition.  Too little integration will 
lead to no synergies; too much integration might destroy the specialized capabilities of 
the companies.  The devil is in the details, as usual; put differently, good execution is 
critical.   
 
The three firms studied here do not achieve this balance, and their approach to integration 
is too light to achieve synergies.  Sharing finance and HR, as Chatterjee describes the 
Tata Steel-Corus company, is surely too little.  This is why shared corporate services is 
not enough to justify conglomerate diversification.  Tata Steel and Corus are in the same 
business, and there is much greater potential for achieving cost reduction through 
economies of scale -- but that would require significant organizational integration.  That 
has been the approach clearly followed successfully by Mittal Steel over decades of 
international acquisitions in the steel industry.34   
 
Kumar points out that "Hindalco believed that Novelis's steady earnings would help 
offset the fluctuations in its profits from year to year."  It is true that achieving this 
benefit would not require any integration.  But, it is also not value creating in the first 
place.  Shareholders can easily achieve such reduction in volatility by diversifying their 
portfolio, and Hindalco did not need to do the acquisition for this reason. 
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Kumar states that Hindalco was happy to leave Novelis's senior managers in place; for 
six months Hindalco supplemented them with only two of its own managers.  This 
sounds more like abdication of managerial responsibilities rather than appropriate 
integration given that Novelis had significant managerial problems at that time.  The 
CEO Brian Sturgell had been fired in August 2006, after which the board appointed an 
interim CEO and then an acting CEO.  It had yet to appoint a regular CEO.  Novelis had 
severe issues with financial reporting, and had recently replaced both the CFO and the 
controller.  Its inability to file quarterly results on time had led to a potential violation of 
debt covenants.  Contrary to the industry norm, Novelis had entered into fixed-price 
contracts taking on unnecessary risk that subsequently turned out badly when aluminum 
prices went up.  Novelis has not been a value creating acquisition.  Stronger managerial 
intervention earlier might have helped improve the situation. 
 
Agency Problems 
The traditional view of the agency problem is that the self-interests of the managers (the 
agents) diverge from those of the shareholders (the principals).  One solution is to align 
their interests by compensating the managers with stock in the company; thus the 
managers will have 'skin in the game'.  This solution does not work in the context of 
Indian firms.  Many Indian firms are managed and controlled by 'promoter shareholders'.  
These promoter-managers already have much financial skin in the game.  The problem is 
that these promoter-managers are very rich, far richer than the other shareholders, and 
their financial perspective might be very different.  The promoter-managers might be 
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more motivated by non-financial factors, such as fame and public adulation, serving a 
national goal, leaving behind a legacy, and the pride of managing a large multinational 
company. 
 
Foreign acquisitions by Indian firms have prompted much nationalistic chest-thumping 
about 'rising India' by the media, and the corporate and political elite.  Indian newspapers 
discussed the Tata-Corus deal under shrill headlines, such as "India poised for global 
supremacy", "The Empire strikes back," and "Global Indian takeover."  Confederation of 
Indian Industry president R. Seshasayee said "Tata Steel’s successful bid for Corus 
Group Plc. is a statement on Indian Industry’s coming of age and takes our Mergers and 
Acquisition levels to a different paradigm. This is a testimony of the confidence and 
competence of Indian Industry.”  Finance Minister Chidambaram said "our industry is 
capable of raising resources to acquire enterprises abroad and manage them efficiently."   
 
All this popular attention might lead top managers to believe they are primarily 
responsible for achieving some nationalistic goals, even misconceived goals.  In 
surprisingly candid comments, Ratan Tata revealed about the Corus acquisition: "We all 
felt that to lose would go beyond the group and it would be an issue of great 
disappointment in the country. So, on the one hand you want to do the right thing by your 
shareholders and on the other hand you did not want to lose."35  Managers, even 
promoter-shareholder-managers, primarily have a fiduciary responsibility to their 
shareholders.  The Indian media expressed much enthusiasm for an Indian takeover of 
two U.K. brands, Jaguar and Land Rover, whose roots date back to the days of British 
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colonial rule.  But, as Thiyaga Rajan, a fund manager who sold his shares in Tata Motors 
after the acquisition announcement, put it "patriotic ebullience doesn't rub off on the 
shares." 
 
The true measure of firm or managerial performance is the economic value created.  
However, much of the popular press discussion confuses firm size to be an automatic 
measure of performance.  Completing an acquisition is considered a sign of success.  
Winning a bidding war for a target company is seen as 'winning'.  But, it is easy to 
increase firm size while losing money.  Similarly, it is easy to 'win' a bidding war by 
paying too much for a target company -- the winners curse. The nationalistic euphoria 
that focuses on firm size and acquisitions can lead to corporate overreach.  Kumar et al 
suggest that "in India's closely knit business community, it is almost becoming a kind of 
fashion statement for companies to make foreign acquisitions."36 
 
This is an ironic twist on the traditional agency problem.  Very rich managers might have 
a different financial perspective from less affluent shareholders, even when the managers 
have much skin in the game.  In fact, too much skin (that is, a large shareholding) might 
make them very rich and lead to this paradoxical result.  This phenomenon is not unique 
to India or emerging countries.  For example, in May 2008, Jerry Yang, the co-founder 
and then CEO of Yahoo, rejected a takeover offer from Microsoft valued at $33 per 
share, a significant premium over the current market price.  There was much criticism in 
the press of Mr. Yang accusing him of shirking his fiduciary responsibilities to 
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shareholders.  By November 2008 Yahoo shares had fallen to only $14.  In January 2009 
the board of directors appointed a new CEO Carol Bartz to replace Mr. Yang. 
 
Another problem might be that corporate governance in India and other emerging 
economies does not function well.  Promoter shareholders have entrenched power and 
there is not enough legal protection for minority shareholders.  For example, none of the 
acquisitions discussed in this paper involved a shareholder vote, even though some of 
them radically transformed the company.  The market for corporate control is also weak 
and does not serve as a disciplining force on managerial power.  For example, there are 
almost no hostile takeovers in India. 
 
Easy Capital 
Kumar et al outline three unique traits of Indian firms that lead to success in acquisitions.  
First, many Indian companies are part of a group of companies.  Second, Indian 
companies have historically had very high debt-equity ratios.  Finally, Indian firms, 
despite being public, are often controlled by powerful families and individual promoters, 
who have considerable management leeway.  These are three important traits common to 
many emerging economy firms.  However, rather than being strengths, I think these are 
weaknesses in the context of foreign acquisitions,.  The third point about managerial 
power exacerbates agency problems, as I have discussed above.  The first two points lead 
to access to capital being too easy. 
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Capital markets by controlling access to capital play an important role in demanding 
good managerial decisions and penalizing bad choices.  This disciplining force is weak in 
the case on Indian acquisitions abroad.  Groups of companies, such as the Tata and Birla 
groups, can leverage group assets to complete deals that would be difficult for any 
individual company. Both Corus and JLR have been difficult to finance and have 
required significant capital infusion from the Tata Group.  A group functions as an 
internal capital market, the same as a conglomerate might do in the developed countries.  
There is much research in finance and strategy that demonstrates that conglomerate 
diversification does not create shareholder value, and in fact destroys value -- the so-
called 'conglomerate discount'.  There is much controversy about whether conglomerates 
create shareholder value in the context of emerging economies.  Khanna and Palepu 
argue that conglomerates add value in emerging economies because of weak institutions 
to support basic business operations.37  Even if one grants this argument in the 
institutional context of emerging economies, it is unlikely to hold for companies making 
large foreign acquisitions in a global environment.  The lack of managerial focus and lack 
of the disciplining force of an external capital market probably leads to a conglomerate 
discount, and is part of the explanation for why these acquisitions do not create 
shareholder value. 
 
Historically Indian firms borrowed from nationalized banks whose mandate was to 
support India's economic development.  The Indian firms thus had access to artificially 
cheap or implicitly subsidized debt capital.38  It is not surprising that they had high debt-
equity ratios.  This tendency was exacerbated in the boom years before the recent 
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financial crisis, when the global financial markets had underpriced risk.  This 
combination led to the Indian firms taking on much debt to finance their foreign 
acquisitions for cash.  With the increasing globalization of Indian capital markets and the 
re-pricing of risk everywhere, the Indian acquirers and their shareholders have paid a 
price for their risky behavior. 
 
Given modern capital markets, deep financial pockets are not a reliable source of 
competitive advantage.  Deep pockets often have big holes; easy capital leads to wastage.  
Deep insights and managerial capabilities are a much better basis for competitive 
advantage and value creation. 
 
Formula for Success 
The empirical evidence above shows that many large foreign acquisitions from India 
have not created shareholder value.  This phenomenon is not unique to India; large 
foreign acquisitions from China have probably not done any better.39  Many of China's 
foreign acquisitions have been in the areas of energy and natural resources, dictated by 
national security policy.  Leaving these aside, Chinese firms have not done well when 
they have pursued large foreign acquisitions seeking technology, brands and distribution -
- the firm-specific intangible capabilities.  For example, TCL, China's large consumer 
electronic company, seeking technology and to go global acquired assets from France's 
Alcatel and Thomson.  After less than three years and large financial losses, TCL has 
shut or sold most of its operations in Europe. 
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This does not mean that emerging economy firms should not do foreign acquisitions.  
The basic formula for successful acquisitions in general applies just as well in this 
context.  First, there needs to be a sound strategic rationale for synergies.  Second, the 
acquisition price has to be reasonable such that the target firm does not capture all the 
value created.  Third, actually achieving synergies requires good execution, which 
usually implies deep managerial integration.  Successful firms like Cemex and Mittal 
Steel have created tremendous shareholder value through a series of foreign acquisitions.  
Both these companies put much emphasis on the above three elements, and especially 
post-merger integration.40   United Spirits from India too has achieved success with this 
approach: significant synergies, reasonable price, and deep integration. 
 
United Spirits Limited (USL) is the flagship company of the United Breweries Group, a 
conglomerate controlled by Dr. Vijay Mallya.  It is the third-largest producer of spirits in 
the world after Diageo and Pernod Ricard.  USL controlled 60% of the market for Indian-
made foreign liquor, the oxymoronic term for Western-style hard liquors manufactured in 
India.  It had a smaller share in the premium and super-premium segments.  In May 2007 
USL acquired Whyte and Mackay, a privately held company that was the fourth-largest 
distiller of Scotch whiskies, for $1.2 billon. Whyte & Mackay produces W&M blended 
Scotch whisky and several brands of single-malt Scotch; it also had a large stock of aged 
single-malt whisky.  The stock market reacted very positively to the acquisition driving 
up the price of United Spirits by 36%, relative to the Sensex index, in six days; its 
relative returns over one year were even more positive: 67%. 
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There was a strong rational for synergies from the acquisition.  "The company sees 
significant revenue growth from this acquisition of Whyte and Mackay," a joint statement 
from the companies said. "In particular, The UB Group will provide access to India and 
other large emerging markets, allowing an acceleration of Whyte and Mackay's growth 
plans."41  At 70 million cases a year, India is the largest whisky market in the world.  The 
upper end of the market is growing rapidly, especially the Scotch whisky segment, which 
is growing at 35-40% per year.42  "The potential for premium Scotch whiskey in India is 
enormous and, with the acquisition of Whyte and Mackay, we now have a strong 
portfolio of internationally recognized brands that we will immediately introduce into the 
Indian market and use our strong distribution muscle fully to our advantage," Mallya 
said.  Another source of synergy was that due to "the shortages and rapidly increasing 
prices of Scotch whisky, we needed a reliable supply source to secure our future 
considering we use Scotch in our Indian blends."  By January 2009, USL had introduced 
nine brands of Scotch whisky into the Indian market.  It had also initiated local bottling 
of Scotch whisky to attract lower duties and make the product available at a lower price. 
 
USL first bid £400 million to acquire Whyte & Mackay, and finally closed the deal by 
paying £595 million ($1.2 billion) a year later, an increase in bid price of nearly 50%. 
While some analysts felt that USL had overpaid for Whyte & Mackay, Mallya insisted "I 
am satisfied that the price agreed is attractive."  At least in hindsight, a significant part of 
the acquisition price was justified by the inventory of Scotch whisky.   Pre-acquisition, 
Whyte & Mackay had 117 million liters of whisky and the prevailing value was £3.12 per 
liter; in 2009 the value had risen to £4.65 (about $6.5) per liter, an appreciation of 49%.43 
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USL played a major role in restructuring the operations of Whyte & Mackay and turning 
around its fortunes in less than one year.44  Pre-acquisition, Whyte & Mackay had 
incurred a loss of about £1.2 million, but in 2007-08 it reported a profit of £13 million.  
Soon after the acquisition, USL appointed Mr. Ashwin Malik, one of its top managers as 
the CEO of Whyte and Mackay.  Earlier, the marketing team was being operated with the 
help of consultants but now USL has put in place a fully functional and experienced 
team.  At the customer interface level, service replies that used to take a fortnight have 
now been reduced to 48 hours.  Pre-acquisition, Glasgow was the only operations center 
that ran all its international businesses.  USL has since decentralized international 
operations; the Indian operations are handled from India.  USL has also shifted Whyte & 
Mackay's focus from selling bulk Scotch to bottling the product. 
 
Conclusion 
Emerging economy companies contemplating foreign acquisitions would do well to heed 
the advice of Malvinder Singh, the former CEO of the pharmaceutical firm Ranbaxy, 
“It’s important for companies to look at the economic rationale, and not get taken to 
extremes by emotion and ego.”45  Following his own advice, Mr. Singh's family, the 
promoter shareholders, sold their entire 35% stake in the company in June 2008 to 
Daiichi Sankyo, a Japanese drug producer.  Daiichi paid about $5 billion to acquire a 
controlling interest in Ranbaxy.  The Indian press echoed sentiments expressed by Anand 
Mahindra, chairman of Mahindra & Mahindra (a large Indian automotive company), "I 
can't help feeling a twinge of regret about an Indian MNC becoming a Japanese 
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subsidiary."  By May 2009 Ranbaxy's share price tanked by 70% compared to the 
acquisition price, forcing Daiichi to write down its investment by $3.6 billion.  Mr. Singh 
resigned from the company and is "ready to move on to other healthcare businesses."  As 
for the billions he earned from the deal, he says "money was not important."46  Managers 
however would do well to remember that it is all about money! 
 
Table 1.  List of acquisitions 
 







Tata Steel Ltd Corus Group Plc Great Britain Iron & Steel 17-Oct-2006 5-Apr-2007 13,454.7  
Hindalco Industries Ltd Novelis Inc USA Aluminum 11-Feb-2007 18-May-2007 5,706.1  
Oil & Natural Gas Corp Ltd Imperial Energy Corp Plc Great Britain Oil & Gas 26-Aug-2008 1-Feb-2009 2,607.2  
Tata Motors Ltd Jaguar Land Rover Operations Great Britain/USA Automotive 26-Mar-2008 2-Jun-2008 2,300.0  
Reliance Industries Ltd Indian Petrochemicals Corp India Petrochemicals 10-Mar-2007 22-Feb-2008 2,117.1  
HDFC Bank Ltd Centurion Bank Of Punjab Ltd India Banking 23-Feb-2008 16-Jul-2008 1,652.6  
Tata Power Co Ltd Kaltrim Prima Coal & Arutmin Indonesia Electricity/Coal mines 31-Mar-2007 27-Jun-2007 1,300.0  
United Spirits Ltd Whyte & Mackay Great Britain Beverages 16-May-2007 16-May-2007 1,176.6  
GMR Infrastructure Ltd Intergen NV Netherlands Eng. & Construction 24-Jun-2008 13-Oct-2008 1,100.0  
Suzlon Energy Repower Systems Ag-Reg'd Germany Electrical equipment 9-Feb-2007 25-May-2007 1,008.6  
Tata Chemicals Ltd General Chemical Ind Product USA Chemicals 31-Jan-2008 27-Mar-2008 1,005.0  
Oil & Natural Gas Corp Ltd Greater Nile Oil Project Canada/Sudan Oil & Gas 30-Oct-2002 12-Mar-2003 766.1  
Tata Group & Tata Tea Energy Brands Inc USA Beverages 23-Aug-2006 25-May-2007 677.0  
Aban Offshore Ltd Sinvest ASA Norway Oilfield services 9-Jan-2007 2-Apr-2007 671.4  
HCL Technologies Ltd Axon Group Plc Great Britain Software 26-Sep-2008 16-Dec-2008 608.3  
Rain Calcining Ltd CII Carbon Llc USA Chemicals 3-Jun-2007 20-Aug-2007 595.0  
Dr. Reddy's Laboratories Betapharm Arzneimittel Gmbh Germany Pharmaceuticals 16-Feb-2006 4-Mar-2006 570.3  
Wipro Ltd Infocrossing Inc USA Information tech. 6-Aug-2007 21-Sep-2007 547.9  
Suzlon Energy Ltd Eve Holding NV - Allianz SE Belgium Electrical equipment 17-Mar-2006 10-May-2006 525.8  
Tata Consultancy Svs Ltd Citigroup Global Services Ltd India Information tech. 8-Oct-2008 5-Dec-2008 512.0  
Idea Cellular Ltd Spice Communications Ltd India Telecommunications 25-Jun-2008 7-Jul-2008 509.2  
Table 2.  Stock market returns 
 







Tata Steel Ltd Great Britain 25.2% 15.9% + + 
Hindalco Industries Ltd USA -26.1% -26.9% - - 
Oil & Natural Gas Corp Ltd Great Britain 6.8% 7.6% + 
Tata Motors Ltd Great Britain/USA -36.3% -31.9% - - 
Reliance Industries Ltd India 48.8% 45.5% + + 
HDFC Bank Ltd India 7.2% 6.7% + 
Tata Power Co Ltd Indonesia 110.4% 109.4% + + 
United Spirits Ltd Great Britain 67.6% 70.5% + + 
GMR Infrastructure Ltd Netherlands 42.5% 42.6% + + 
Suzlon Energy Germany 4.0% -1.6% 0 
Tata Chemicals Ltd USA -4.8% 7.8% 0 
Oil & Natural Gas Corp Ltd Canada/Sudan -9.4% -4.0% - 
Tata Group & Tata Tea USA -43.2% -34.5% - - 
Aban Offshore Ltd Norway 144.0% 139.7% + + 
HCL Technologies Ltd Great Britain 26.8% 26.1% + + 
Rain Calcining Ltd USA 67.0% 67.8% + + 
Dr. Reddy's Laboratories Germany -16.5% -32.4% - - 
Wipro Ltd USA -3.1% -4.0% - 
Suzlon Energy Ltd Belgium -39.5% -42.7% - - 
Tata Consultancy Svs Ltd India -44.0% -40.2% - - 
Idea Cellular Ltd India -21.2% -21.0% - - 
 
Key: Strongly positive (>10% on both measures) + + 
 Slightly positive (<10% on both measures) + 
 Neutral (different signs on two measures) 0 
 Slightly negative (>-10% on both measures) - 
 Strongly negative (<-10% on both measures) - - 
 
Table 3.  Stock performance summary 
 
 Foreign acquisitions Domestic acquisitions 
Strongly positive 7 1 
Slightly positive 1 1 
Neutral 2 0 
Slightly negative 2 0 
Strongly negative 5 2 
          Total 17 4 
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Table 4.  Comparing short-term and long-term stock market returns 
 





Tata Steel Ltd Great Britain 25.2% 1.3%
Hindalco Industries Ltd USA -26.1% -12.4%
Oil & Natural Gas Corp Ltd Great Britain 6.8% 4.7%
Tata Motors Ltd Great Britain/USA -36.3% -3.3%
Reliance Industries Ltd India 48.8% 1.5%
HDFC Bank Ltd India 7.2% -1.9%
Tata Power Co Ltd Indonesia 110.4% -0.5%
United Spirits Ltd Great Britain 67.6% 36.0%
GMR Infrastructure Ltd Netherlands 42.5% -7.4%
Suzlon Energy Germany 4.0% -16.5%
Tata Chemicals Ltd USA -4.8% -7.4%
Oil & Natural Gas Corp Ltd Canada/Sudan -9.4% 2.1%
Tata Group & Tata Tea USA -43.2% -4.9%
Aban Offshore Ltd Norway 144.0% -7.2%
HCL Technologies Ltd Great Britain 26.8% -0.9%
Rain Calcining Ltd USA 67.0% 12.9%
Dr. Reddy's Laboratories Germany -16.5% 15.0%
Wipro Ltd USA -3.1% 2.9%
Suzlon Energy Ltd Belgium -39.5% 2.2%
Tata Consultancy Svs Ltd India -44.0% -4.5%
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